\section{Conclusion}
In this paper, we present a mixing system in which the mix is incentivized, blinded, and accountable. Furthermore, the system is not vulnerable to denial of service attacks caused by a single user refusing to sign a joint transaction. The system modifies the Mixcoin \cite{mixcoin} mixing protocol by using blinded signatures \cite{chaum} and a public append-only log. The public log makes it possible for a third party to verify that the user or mix cheated in the protocol when it is presented with the appropriate evidence, thus keeping all parties accountable. The system retains many of the benefits of the Mixcoin system, while also relaxing the constraint that the mix must be trusted to keep the input/output addess mappings of users hidden.

At this point, we have not been able to find any major flaws in our system, and we believe it holds promise. Further work will scrutinize the system against any attacks that have been proposed against mixing systems, and attempt to uncover any flaws in our system. Time constraints have prevented us from performing this analysis in this paper.
